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I. INTRODUCTION
The process of allocating radio spectrum for Third Generation ("3G")
wireless communications' in the European Union ("EU" or "the Union")
illustrates the convergence of serious economic and political challenges
facing the Union and its member states in the near term. The European
Commission's ("EC") telecommunications policy focuses in part on
quickly establishing the groundwork for a 3G wireless market throughout
the EU.2 The EC's objective is, in essence, to create the structure of the 3G
market before the demand for one actually exists.3 In so doing, the EC
hopes to create a large 3G market in Europe where European firms will
have a very high market penetration. It is hoped that the European 3G
market will, when fully developed, provide revenues and economies of
scale that will allow European firms to compete effectively for 3G markets
in Eastern Europe, Russia, Africa, Asia, and elsewhere.4 The EC is
wagering that 3G will be the network by which the world will maintain
person-to-person voice contact and interface with the Internet. It is also
wagering that the telecommunications sector, via 3G, will create a
multiplier effect throughout the European economy, thereby rescuing
Europe from the structural economic crisis that has plagued it for decades!
This is a colossal wager. If the EC is right, then Europe may well be
1. Third Generation wireless communications is seen as a major leap over current
digital cellular telephone technology. Third Generation technology's high transmission rates
will allow mobile access to the Internet via cellular telephones or other devices. See Sean
Buckley, 3G Wireless: Mobility Scales New Heights, TELECOMM. ONLINE (Oct. 2000), at
http://www.telecoms-mag.com/issues/200010/tcs/3g-wireless.html.
2. See note 7, infra, and accompanying text.
3. See Interview with Ignacio Garcia Alves, Associate, Arthur D. Little & Bruno
Duarte, Senior Manager, Arthur D. Little, LES ECHOS, Nov. 17, 1999, at 60, available at
LEXIS News Library, http://www.lexis.com [hereinafter Garcia & Duarte Interview].
4. See Wolf Sauter, The Compatibility of Industrial and Competition Policy: The Case
of Telecommunications, in EUROPEAN TRADE AND INDUSTRY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FUTURE
DIRECTIONS IN EC LAW AND POLICY 53, 54 (Kees Jan Kuilwijk & Robert Wright eds., 1996).
5. See id. at 60. Sauter concludes: "Due to its convergence with the high technology
sectors of electronics, components, and information technology, the European position in
telecommunications has been construed as a 'last chance' to expand its lead in this sector
into other areas, and remedy earlier failures." Id. The EC itself has made similar statements
in a series of policy papers. See Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy in the Context of
European Community Policies such as Telecommunications, Broadcasting, Transport,
R&D, COM(98)596 final, at i-iii; Green Paper on the Convergence of the
Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for
Regulation, COM(97)623 final, at ii-iii. See also The Information Society Promotion Office
of the EC, at http://europa.eu.int/information society/topics/telecoms/radiospee/mobile/
index en.htm. (last visited Aug. 30, 2001) (listing the goals and current status of mobile
communications in the EC).
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poised to make its broader Trans-European Networks ("TEN") policy a
reality. A successful TEN based on 3G would allow the EU to enter the
twenty-first century with real economic growth and a European currency,
the Euro,7 that performs well against the dollar. If the EC has bet
incorrectly, however, the prestige of the EU will be seriously damaged.
This Note argues that signs exist which suggest that the failure of Europe's
83G policy is likely. In Europe, 3G is much more than an EC economic
policy initiative or a drama for telecom firms (and their investors)
competing for market share. Third Generation technology is also a political
initiative that the EC itself considers crucial in Europe's prosperity and for
the survival of European integration, which is the cornerstone of the
Maastrict and Amsterdam treaties.9 The stakes are quite high.
This Note examines spectrum allocation for 3G mobile wireless
networks in Europe in light of larger EC telecommunications and
competition policies. The European Commission has allowed each member
state to allocate spectrum to firms in two ways: (1) by the free market
auction; and (2) by the "beauty pageant" method by which firms submit
detailed proposals to the government, and government bureaucrats make
the final selections.'0 This Note focuses on France as the prime example of
the beauty pageant method. This Note argues that, despite the "excesses" of
the prices of spectrum on the free market auctions, the beauty pageant
method has even more disturbing drawbacks.
6. TENs are an envisioned result of a general policy initiative that wishes to identify
industries and markets where cross-border collaboration and cross-border competition can
flourish. The general idea is to facilitate larger, pan-European telecommunications firms and
economic sectors that will not be hindered by national boundaries and national regulations.
7. As is widely known, in its efforts to integrate Europe and surmount trade barriers,
the EU and member states such as Germany, France, and Italy have adopted a new currency,
the Euro. All prices in France, for instance, are currently listed in both French Francs and
Euros. Within a few years the French Franc, German Mark, and Italian Lire will disappear,
and EU citizens will use the Euro.
8. See infra notes 187-189, and accompanying text.
9. See Sauter, supra note 4, at 79.
10. See L'Autorite de Regulation des Telecommunications, UMTS: Results of the
Allocation Procedure for 3rd Generation Mobile Metropolitan Licences [sic] in France,
May 31, 2001, http:llwww.art-telecom.fr/dossiers/umtslview-umts.htm. The French
regulatory agency explained:
While discussions on the stakes of UMTS technology (Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System) had already begun in France in January 1998, at the
Commission consultative des radiocommunications (CCR), the process was
officially launched at the Community level by the decision dated 14
December 1998 of the European Parliament and Council, regarding the
coordinated introduction in the Community of a 3 d generation mobile wireless
communication system.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Clearly, each method of spectrum allocation has its dangers and its
rewards. This Note posits that the EC committed itself to a schizophrenic
policy when it allowed member states to devise their own methods of
allocating frequency spectrum. The EC's general policy in the realm of
telecommunications has been to liberalize markets." Despite the
bureaucratic overtones of the EC's 3G policy, deregulation and free market
competition have been vital to the EC's telecommunications policy.' 2 Yet,
as allocation approaches go, the beauty pageant method of spectrum
allocation is inherently very suspicious of the market. Again, this Note
argues that France's activities show that national telecommunications
authorities are capable of operating on nonmarket assumptions in much of
their management of this emerging market. Essentially, French authorities
have reverted to dirigiste traditions in the near term. Such a reversion, at a
time when the EC is reassessing its role in European affairs, does not bode
well for the EU.
II. THE FRENCH PARADOX
A. The Dirigiste Tradition in France
The French word "dirigiste" is an adjective derived from the noun
"dirigisme." To any educated French person, and to students of French
history, the word is very familiar. In its broadest sense, dirigisme comprises
the entire centralizing tradition in French historical development, from the
long reign of Louis XIV, punctuated by the rule of Napoleon, to the present
day. In its narrower sense, used today, dirigisme3 refers to the central
government's role in "directing" the French economy.
One must be careful, however, when talking about the dirigiste model
of governance. It is important to remember that for all of the initiative the
central government might make in shaping markets and setting priorities,
the French system has never approached the extremes of central planning
11. See Sauter, supra note 4, at 79-80.
12. Id.
13. "Dirigisme: Systkme iconomique dans lequel l'Etat assume la direction des
mcanismes geconomique d'une maire provisoire et en conservant les cadres de la socijtj
capitaliste (4 la diffirence du socialisme) .... [antonym] Libiralisme." PAUL ROBERT, LE
NouvEAu PETIT ROBERT: DiCTIONNAIRE ALPHABA TIQUE ET ANALOGIQUE DE LA LANGUE
FRAN AISE 652-53. (Josette Rey-Debove & Alain Rey eds., 1994). The translation of the
definition is as follows: "Dirigisme: An economic system in which the state assumes the
provisional management of economic policy while preserving the structure of capitalist
society (in contrast to Socialism). Antonym: Liberalism." (author's translation). In the
French lexicon, liberalism is equivalent to laissez-faire, free market capitalism, where the
government plays a small role and private businesses are allowed to compete with minimal
restraints. Id. at 1090.
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that were witnessed in Eastern Europe and Russia under the communist
regimes. 4 There was a four-year plan in France after the Second World
War, but that was rather extraordinary and was a function of Marshall Plan
aid as much as it was the result of the devastation of the war.15 Of course,
French industry during the First World War, like American industry in the
Second World War, was subordinated to the war effort, which entailed
some central planning. The centralization of industry under the Vichy
regime from 1940-1944 is more difficult to account for, however. 16 These
unique periods aside, French industry has never been fully "coordinated"
from the center and used for the purposes of the government, as was the
case in Nazi Germany. 7 That said, in comparison to the English-speaking
countries, or as the French would say, the "Anglo-Saxon" countries, the
French have throughout their history shown a persistent aversion to
"liberalism," by which they mean free markets and limited government.
8
14. "Central planning" is a term of art common to the fields of history, economics, and
political science. It refers to the method by which the entire socialist economy was planned
out years in advance by a central agency such as Gosplan (an acronym in Russian for "State
Planning Agency") in the former Soviet Union. See generally DAVID LANE, SOVIET
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1985); MARTIN MALIA, THE SOVIET TRAGEDY: A HISTORY OF
SOCIALISM IN RUSSIA, 1917-1991 (Free Press, 1994).
15. GORDON WRIGHT, FRANCE IN MODERN TIMES: FROM THE ENLIGHTENMENT TO THE
PRESENT 409 (4th ed., W.W. Norton 1987). Jean Monnet headed the Economic Planning
Commission of General de Gaulle's Fourth Republic. The Planning Commission drew up
the "four-year plan of investment in key branches of the economy." Ia
16. The Vichy regime is still an open sore in French society. Headed by the hero of the
First World War, Marshall Philippe P6tain, it was a quasi-fascist, quasi-nationalist regime
that slavishly collaborated with Nazi Germany. See generally ROBERT O. PAXTON, VICHY
FRANCE: OLD GuARD AND NEW ORDER (1972); JOHN F. SWEETS, CHOICES IN VICHY FRANCE:
THE FRENCH UNDER NAZI OCCUPATION (1986).
17. "Coordination" is a term of art in the field of German History. The Nazis used the
term Gleichschaltung to describe their brand of central planning, where ownership of
industry remained in private hands, but the business subordinated itself to Nazi direction.
See generally KARL DIETRIECH BRACHER, THE GERMAN DICTATORSHIP: THE ORIGINS,
STRUCTURE, AND EFFECTS OF GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM (Jean Steinberg, trans., Praeger
Publishers 1970); AVRAHAM BARKAi, THE NAZI ECONOMY: IDEOLOGY, THEORY, AND
POLICY (Ruth Hadass-Vashitz, trans., Berg Publishers 1990).
18. Scholars disagree whether France is a dysfunctional "stalemate society," or rather a
delicate balance committed to gradual change. Both groups of scholars seem to agree,
though, that a fear of Anglo-American liberalism and free market competition is at the basis
of both French modernization drives through the four year plan and, more recently, French
resistance to change. Several scholars support the "stalemate society" view. See MICHEL
CROZIER, L4 SOCIATt BLOQUE 130 (1970); DAVID LANDES, French Business and
Businessmen: A Social and Cultural Survey, in MODERN FRANCE: PROBLEMS OF THE THIRD
AND FOURTH REPUBLICS 352-53 (Edward Mead Earle ed., Russell & Russell 1964);
STANLEY HOFFMAN, ET AL., IN SEARCH OF FRANCE 3-4 (1963). The other camp is represented
by the work of Catherine Gremion. See generally CATHERINE GREMION, PROFESSION
DtCIDEURS. POUVOIR DES HAUTS FONCTIONNAIRES ETR9FORM DE L'1TAT (1979). In THEODORE
ZELDIN, THE FRENCH 171-74 (1983), Zeldin, a noted English specialist on France, defends
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It is fair to say that the French have maintained, in significant
measure, the medieval period's hostility to commerce' 9-all the while
excelling at commerce in many regards, especially in the realm of high
quality agricultural items. Scholars have noted that even French business
people and industry leaders take a "smaller is better" approach and at times
consciously avoid expansion and market dominance.2' They prefer old
methods and to maintain family control over businesses, rather than to rush
into initial public offerings on the stock exchange or into large financing
2'
arrangements with banks in order to expand production or to modermze. -
In France today, one can easily imagine a communist union leader and a
businessperson agreeing that there are evils in free market competition,
that globalization is a threat to French identity, and that hefty sales taxes
French "planification" and argues that the slow pace of change in France is due to a system
where business, government, and sometimes large labor unions coordinate major business
decisions together. Zeldin concludes that the difficult task of pleasing so many different
constituencies means that decisions are slow in coming. Id at 174. He cites approvingly the
work of Catherine Gremion. Id. On French "planification," see generally RICHARD F.
KUISEL, CAPITALISM AND THE STATE IN MODERN FRANCE (1981).
19. DAVID S. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT 132-33 n. 1
(1969). The obsession with thrift is derived from agricultural society's fears of subsistence
crises. 1d. After all, until the nineteenth Century there were no rail systems in Europe, and a
large crop failure in one region meant starvation for that region because food could not be
shipped efficiently over long distances. The obsession with thrift and the attempt to control
unpredictable economic and natural forces were enshrined in the guild system, which
controlled licenses for nearly every type of skilled craft in the cities and towns of Europe for
many centuries. "The guilds have long since disappeared, but in countries like France and
Germany, the reprobation of judgment by the market place continues to this day." Id.
Landes adds that French society generally views entrepreneurs as socially subversive:
"[Tihe entrepreneur's preference for the greatest possible profit per unit of sale, as against
higher total profit at some larger output, accorded with a general condemnation of
competition, particularly price competition, as unfair and even socially subversive." Id. at
132. Landes notes that, for the French, economic demand is seen as fixed and price
competition is seen as an attempt to undercut one's neighbor's fair share of production and
sales. Id.
20. See Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, France Agri-Food Export Market
Assessment Report Statistical Update, Aug. 2001, at http://ats.agr.ca/public/htmldocs
e3203.htm. The fact that the French excel in luxury items underscores my point: luxury
items are generally small production items of high cost; they require significant skilled labor
inputs, a hallmark of medieval production. Of course, this is not to suggest French workers
are wearing wooden clogs and still belong to medieval guilds, but, following Landes, this
Note suggests a continuity of the mental outlook and expectations of many French
producers.
21. See Landes, supra note 19, at 131.
22. Id. Landes adds: "Thus the identification of the producer with his tools and methods




(up to thirty percent on some items) should not be cut.23 Both may fear the
EU.
Of course, city communists and landed aristocrats do not run the
French Government. Elected politicians, and more importantly, an educated
technocratic elite do-with students from a handful of elite schools staffing
practically every important position in the French bureaucracy. 24 The result
is naturally that the elite speaks in its own language and shares many
common assumptions about what French society and economy should
aspire to be.25 Were this scenario to exist in American society, it would be
as though all or most officials in the U.S. government, as well as the people
running the major television networks, had all graduated exclusively from
26the business, law, and graduate schools of Harvard and, say, Stanford.
The French elite believes in the French government's competence to shape
markets, and to direct both the economy and even society as a whole, in
27broad terms. The French invention of the Minitel, a computer terminal
connected to the telephone that was widely available in French homes in
the 1980s, is a prime example of the dirigiste tradition at work.
23. The statement is an exaggeration, but not by much. France has been very slow to
lower taxes, and none of its five major political parties can be said to have a strong tax-
cutting platform, as one finds with Britain's Conservative Party or America's Republican
Party. Only recently have the French begun to cut taxes, which still can take over 60% of
the gross income of workers in the highest brackets. See Jack Ewing et al., Tax-Cut Fever:
The Only Question is How Much to Slash, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Mar. 6, 2000, at http://
www.businessweekcom:/2000/00_10/b3671123.htm?scriptFramed. Even after a series of
reductions, the rate on corporations was estimated to remain at 40% in 2001. Id.
24. WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 453. Wright notes that the near-revolution in May, 1968
arose because there were not enough government jobs to go around for university graduates:
"The desirable positions were monopolized.., by the graduates of the grandes icoles-
those highly selective training schools such as the Polytechnique and the Institut d'ttudes
Politiques that had long dominated access to the upper bureaucracy in government and
business." Id. Wright notes that reforms did not solve the problem and that "ferociously
competitive" state exams ensured quality but also perpetuated the power of the elite:
"Indeed, the creation of the new Ecole Nationale d'Administration in 1945 increased the
grip of that elite on the levers of power in France; for the so-called 'Enarchs' (graduates of
the E.N.A.) have almost monopolized the top positions in government and even in some
sectors of business." Id
25. But see ZELDIN, supra note 18, at 161-62.
26. See ZELDIN, supra note 18, at 161-63. This chapter, entitled "How to Find the
People with Real Power," asserts that the E.N.A. is "where many of the rulers of France
have been trained." Id. at 161.
27. Id. at 169. Zeldin, who is generally sympathetic to the French bureaucratic tradition,
comments that the extreme centralization of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Periods has
left a profound mark on France: "The legacy of this history has been the French habit of
accepting government interference in almost every aspect of life, and of seeing the solution
to problems in the granting of state subsidies and the creation of new state institutions." Id.
Zeldin notes with evident amazement that over 3,000 laws exist in France to protect the
status, job security, and 'turf' of bureaucrats. Id.
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Installed, the Minitel system was a dry run at an internet before the
Internet was invented. When the French government introduced it as part of
France Telecom's phone services, the Minitel was revolutionary." With a
black and white screen and a primitive terminal attached to phone lines,
one could, beginning in 1982, search phone numbers nationwide online in
France. 29 Soon after, services expanded to include the ability to book train,
plane, and theater tickets; to check the weather; to read the news; and to
send and receive text messages. 30 By 1995, the Minitel offered more than
26,000 online services. 31 Despite some technological improvements,
however, the Minitel today remains essentially what would be considered
as a "text-only" online system.
For many years France was regarded as one of the most
technologically advanced countries because of its Minitel system, and as
late as 1995 some observers wondered which system-Minitel or the
Internet-would prevail over the other.32 Unlike the Internet, with its
decentralized development, the centralized Minitel in France had economic
incentives for upgrades only, rather than a wholesale rethinking of the
system. This situation was caused at least in part by the enormous resources
that France Telecom, the government-owned phone company, had sunk
into the Minitel . When first the personal computer revolution and then the
Internet came along, France resisted, believing that the Minitel was
sufficient. In sum, the French Government clung for far too long to the
Minitel. And, as a result, France is woefully behind the United States in
computer technology today.34
One virtue of the dirigiste tradition is that it can deliver, relatively
quickly and with a nationwide commitment, innovations like the IMinitel or
the Train t Grande Vitesse ("TGV") bullet train for which France is justly
28. H.K. Univ. of Sci. & Tech., France - History, at http:llwww.ust.hkl-webiway/
content/France/History.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2001). The first test runs of the Minitel
were launched in 1980. By early 1984, France Telecom began distributing free Minitel
terminals to all subscribers. See id.
29. Jack Kessler, The French Minitel: Is There Digital Life Outside of the 'US ASCI




32. Kessler, supra note 29.
33. See Junko Yoshida, French Minitel Romances the Web, at http://www.eetimes.com/
news/97/963news/french.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2001) ("In the emerging world of the
Internet, where many companies are still scrambling to implement successful electronic
commerce business models, Minitel's profitability justifies France Telecom's determination
to hang onto Minitel services.").
34. See Amy L. Fletcher, Videotex, the Internet, and Innovation in France and the
United States, ANTENNA, Apr. 2000, at http://www.mercurians.org/4-2000/videotex.html.
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famous.35 Among the tradition's shortcomings is the way in which it
encourages stagnation once a new item is introduced.
Examined from a neoclassical economic perspective, the dirigiste
tradition sinks large sums of money into huge projects that may or may not
pay off. For, while the bullet train has been a big success, the Minitel is
now fading, and the French Concorde's profitability and future use has
fallen into question.37 In any event, the incentive in the dirigiste system is
to stick with the investment, despite what consumers may want.
At least one observer has noted the analogy between the Minitel and
3G.38 He argues that as long as the coming mobile Internet is wedded to the
cellular phone, as in Europe's current thinking, it will produce a Minitel-
like failure, but this time across all of Europe.39 His argument boils down
to one of ergonomics and practicality: the Blackberry and various personal
data assistants have much more surface area available for video and for
interfacing than a cell phone does.40 As this Note argues, the extreme detail
of the French telecommunications policy, and the extent to which
bureaucrats already exercise control, bodes ill for a flexible response to
changes in markets, technology, and consumer preferences.
If the mobile Internet is not ultimately as suited to cellular telephones
as it is to technology like a Blackberry, for example, then the dirigiste
tradition in France, as it is currently expressed in telecommunications
policy, indicates that France may find itself wedded to an outmoded system
a few years down the road-just as the Minitel has seen its position erode
in relation to the Internet in the past few years. The potential for failure in
35. See Kessler, supra note 29 (describing how France Telecom and Alcatel, France's
largest electronic equipment manufacturer, paired together under government direction to
create the Minitel: "Minitel has very much been the creation of the French national
government."); see also Ewan Sutherland, Minitel-The Resistible Rise of French Videotex,
at http://www.sutherla.dircon.co.uk/minitel/developing.htm (1995). Sutherland notes that
the original "owner" of France Telecom, the French Post and Telegraph Service ("PTI"' or
"La Poste") was inspired by huge state-run projects like the TGV and the Concorde
supersonic jet:
Whether as the DGT or as France Tel6com, the French PTT was breaking new
ground in moving into videotex. The DGT knew little about broadcasting or about
collaboration with information providers and almost nothing about consumers.
What it did have was the ambition and the desire to emulate other great
technological feats, such as Concorde and the Train i Grande Vitesse (rGV).
Id.
36. Id.
37. See BAC-SUD Concorde, at http://www.aemann.pwp.blueonder.co.uk/aircraft/
british/concorde.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2001).
38. See Mobile Phones: Europe's Next Minitel?, JAKOB NiELsoN's ALERTBOX, at
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France, combined with more flexible approaches in some other European
countries, means that the EU's goal of a Europe-wide mobile Internet may
not come to pass. Before developing this argument in more detail, this Note
will examine the role of France in the EU and the importance of
telecommunications policy for the future viability of the EU.
B. France in the European Order
After the Second World War, the French, led by international banker
Jean Monnet, embarked on an ambitious program to modernize the French
economy and society. Plans included huge, centrally managed investments
in industry and, closely linked with this sort of dirigisme, the creation of a
European economic community that would more efficiently allocate
4'
resources in Western Europe and create a large free-trade zone. In the
period between 1944 and the early 1960s, the French population jumped
from forty to fifty million; the GNP increased 500% from 1950 to 1980;
and automobiles, electricity, appliances, and supermarkets became
universal in France by the 1960s, more than a generation after the United
42States. French scholar Michel Crozier has remarked that change in
French politics usually comes as a result of the force of circumstance,
rather than through the normal functioning of parliamentary bargaining.
The French defeat to Hitler over only six weeks in 1940, together with the
devastation of the 1944 bombing and the German economic rape of France
from 1940 to 1944, created a systemic crisis that gave Americanized
Frenchman Monnet the opening he needed to push systemic reform in
France.
41. ERic ROUSSEL, JEAN MONNET 428 (1996). French modernization after World War II
was devised in the Monnet Plan. Monnet convinced General de Gaulle that the only way to
rebuild France, and French greatness, was through massive economic and financial
modernization. Id. Monnet, a sort of French Bill Gates, wielded truly astounding political
and economic influence on France and the whole of Europe. Long after de Gaulle,
Adenauer, and Schuman had left the scene, an aged Monnet was still, in the 1970s, traveling
the world on behalf of the European Community, being received by world leaders whenever
he chose: "Europe, as everyone knows, was his thing, he carried her to her baptism, he
defined her: from the moment he arrived, how could one not listen to him?" Id at 861. On
the Monnet Plan, see id. chs. 13-22. On Monnet's strong link to the United States and on the
role of his many elite American supporters, see id. chs. 14, 16. On this latter point, see also
MONNET AND THE AMERICANS: THE FATHER OF A UNITED EUROPE AND HIS U.S. SUPPORTERS
1-4 (Clifford P. Hackett ed., 1995). The European Coal and Steel Community was founded
in April, 1951, and its successor, the European Economic Community, was founded in 1957.
Both were officially products of the Schuman Plan, which owed a great deal to Jean
Monnet. See Pascal Fontaine, Seven Key Days in the Making of Europe, at
http:lleuropa.eu.intlabc/obj/chrono/40years/7days/en.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2001).
42. WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 444,454.
43. See Paul Warwick, Ideology, Culture, and Gamesmanship in French Politics, 50
JOURNAL OF MODERN HISTORY 631, 636-37 (1978).
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The EU's very genesis began with the plans and activities of Monnet
and his incredible influence in Paris, Bonn, and Washington, D.C.44 Jean
Monnet himself designed and proposed the European Economic
Community, the direct forerunner of the EU. He also designed and
proposed the EurAtom initiative and crafted the European Coal and Steel
Community, the direct forerunner of the European Economic Communty.
Not surprisingly, a quite young and brilliant Monnet, who had been
indispensable as early as World War I, when he organized the French war
industry and coordinated the war effort between the United States, Britain,
41
and France. U.S. diplomat Robert Murphy declared once that Monnet was
"in many respects more remarkable than de Gaulle.
47
In brief, Monnet's brilliance was his recognition that economic
cooperation among Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and France
was the first step toward the creation of a united Europe.48 Monnet's
inclusion of Germany, with its rich coal fields and industry, was an inspired
stroke of genius; Monnet understood that, after two disastrous wars with
their neighbors over the Rhine, France could best avoid a future war with
Germany by economically and politically integrating with the Germans,
rather than competing against them as in the past.49 For their part, the
Americans encouraged European integration because American
policymakers saw European economic integration as the crucial element to
guarantee the survival of NATO, which was the primary means of
responding to Stalin's creation of the East Bloc during the early years of
the Cold War. For nearly fifty years, Monnet's vision served as the basis
for continued European integration.50
44. See Fontaine, supra note 41. Professor Fontaine, in this official EU publication,
says of Monnet:
It was Jean Monnet, with his unique wealth of experience as a negotiator and man
of peace, who suggested to the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, and the
German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, that a community of interest be
established between their countries, in the shape of a jointly managed market in
coal and steel under the control of an independent authority. The proposal was
officially tabled by France on 9 May 1950, and was warmly received by Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.
Id.
45. See Richard Mague, Jean Monnet: A Biographical Essay, in MONNET AND THE
AMERICANS, supra note 41, at 7-24.
46. See id. at 9.
47. Id. at 8.
48. Fontaine, supra note 41.
49. See id. ("What could be done to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past and to
create the right conditions for a lasting peace between such recent enemies? The nub of the
problem was the relationship between France and Germany. A link had to be forged
between the two.. ").
50. See JEAN MONNEr: THE PATH TO EUROPEAN UNITY 205-208 (Douglas Brinkley &
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With the downfall of the U.S.S.R. between 1989 and 1991, however,
European integration was no longer needed for defensive purposes.
Integration became an end in and of itself. The new strength of the
American economy in the 1980s and 1990s, along with the sole superpower
status of the United States, provided new reasons for European
governments to pursue integration. Further, since the 1970s, Europe has
been plagued by structural economic challenges, underscored by chronic
unemployment that has been hovering at thirteen percent since the early
1980s in most European countries. Faced with aggressive challenges in
many product markets by Japan, Korea, and other Pacific Rim countries,
the French feel especially besieged by "globalization," which they
understand as global economic competition and the sale of products
manufactured in newer factories with cheap foreign labor.5' The result has
been that many in France have viewed the EU as their vehicle to defend
French economic interests against American and Asian competition. To
some extent, a great deal of hope has been placed in the EU to deliver both
(and, some might argue, paradoxically) a better economy and the
preservation of the French way of life, which includes, now by law, a
thirty-five hour work week.12 Perhaps inevitably, such excessive faith in
the EU has also brought corresponding disillusion. For instance, the
prestigious Le Monde diplomatique, the French equivalent of a weekly New
York Times special edition devoted to world affairs, described the recent
mass demonstrations against the EU in the French city of Nice on
Clifford Hackett, eds., 1991).
51. See ROle de la prisidence franqaise, EUROP MAGAZINE, at http://www.monde-
diplomatique.fr/cahier/europe/vedrinel (July 1, 2000) (Interview of Hubert Vdrine,
France's Minister of Foreign Affairs. He responds to a question about whether the recent
fire bombings of McDonald's fast food restaurants in France meant that there was a growing
anti-Americanism in France by stating: "The [British and U.S.] newspapers have all chosen
an incident to show and to dramatize. A McDonald's was also firebombed in England three
weeks ago. On the contrary, there is in reality an anti-hegemonic attitude, anti-globalization
in this country but that attitude exists in the United States, too.") (author's translation).
52. See generally Mark Hunter, Les salaris amiricains aimeraient le temps de vivre,
LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Nov. 1999, available at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/
1999/1 I/HUNTER/12646.html. Hunter writes that in contrast to the guaranteed French
workweek of thirty-five hours, Americans work much harder and longer. He claims that
American capitalism has created armies of overworked people, not armies of the
unemployed that Karl Marx predicted. He quotes Juliet Schor as estimating that Americans
work 245 hours more, or six weeks longer, than they did in 1973 to maintain their 1973
standard of living. Id. He also cites the International Labor Bureau for the following average
hours worked per week, per worker in 1980 and in 1997: U.S. in 1980, 1,883 hours; U.S. in
1997, 1,966 hours; France in 1980, 1,809 hours, France in 1997, 1,656 hours; Japan in 1980,
2,121 hours, Japan in 1997, 1,889 hours. Id. Hunter's article condemns the American
system, which he states damages personal lives and harms families. Id. This Note argues
that such an article is proof of the deep divide between French and American attitudes
toward work and markets.
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December 11, 2000 as follows:
The demonstrations, which amassed close to 100,000 people at the
start of the Nice Summit, are far from being isolated. The
demonstrations signify the intrusion of the citizens into the history of
the construction of Europe, as well as the exasperation of the citizens,
not to mention their disillusion, with a process whose results they only
see as negative: twenty million unemployed and close to forty million
impoverished, inability to cope with the mad cow crisis or with
maritime disasters, and [the European Union being] a complete non-
entity in world diplomacy .... The disillusion is even more profound
because the European Union is one of the few international means of
resisting Liberalism's [i.e. laissez faire] globalization which is the
process of rendering the Free Market, blind and destructive, the total
master of the planet. 5
3
The EU does not agree with the French on everything. To put it
mildly, the EU, while itself certainly somewhat dirigiste, has in comparison
to France been a bastion of free market thinking. The EU has, with its
"competition laws," the European equivalent to antitrust in the United
States, attempted to force member states to deregulate state-owned
industries, stop state subsidies from being given to inefficient government-
owned firms, and allow for the freer play of market forces-many times
over the resistance of member states.54 The EU has been at the forefront of
eliminating protectionist laws within the Union, often to the outrage of
French farmers who, it seems, block the highways of France several times
each year in protest.55
Currently, many French feel divided about the EU. On the one hand,
it is a promising tool to use against the haughty Americans; on the other
hand, it interferes with French national policy too much. The EC may have
focused much of its energy on telecommunications policy in an effort to
53. Anne-Cdcile Robert et al., Europe, l'enlisement ou le sursaut: Un cahier spdcial sur
l'Europe, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, available at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/
cahier/europe (last visited Aug. 26, 2001).
54. See SCADPlus: Competition, at http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus (last visited
Aug. 26, 2001) (this statement by the EU on its own competition policy states further that
"[c]ompetition policy is essential for the completion of the internal market. The raison
d'6tre of the internal market is to allow firms to compete on a level playing field in all the
Member States.") [hereinafter SCADPlus]. The basis of competition policy is to "encourage
economic efficiency by creating a climate favourable to innovation and technical progress."
State subsides and certain state regulations are seen as a particular threat: "It must also
prevent Member States' governments from distorting the rules by discriminating in favour
of public enterprises or by giving aid to private-sector companies (State aid)." Id.
55. See, e.g., Farmers Block Streets to Press for BSE Aid, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europelfrance/02/26/madcow.france.protests (Feb. 26,
2001); Angry French Cauliflower Farmers Block Airport Runway, N.DO TIMES NEWS,
Apr. 16, 1998, at http://archive.nandotimes.comlnewsroomlntn/biz/041698/bizl5_13936
_body.html.
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introduce deregulation and free market competition into what it views as
the area of the economy with the greatest future growth potential. It is
running up against the desires of some of its member states, however, to
resist embracing the market. That the French have passed a law mandating
a thirty-five hour work week should explain much about French concerns.
After all, the French passed not only a reduction in the work week, but also
many accompanying laws that try to pay similar wages for lesser hours
56
worked . In sum, the French are trying to preserve their entire social
security system and their way of life against the advances of the free
market.17 Now we shall see just how resistant the French are to the spirit of
European telecommunications policy.
III. THE ROLE OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY IN EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION
A. Role of the European Commission
The EC is the dominant body of the EU because it is charged with
both initiating legislation and implementing policy. 8 While checks and
balances limit the scope of its activities, the EC is formidable because it
comprises both executive and legislative powers. It is also the largest
branch of the EU government, with over 15,000 employees. As part of its
executive powers, it may also initiate legal proceedings against member
states and businesses before the EU's Court of International Justice. 9
The EC derives its power from the treaties that formed the EU and the
judicial decisions interpreting the articles of the treaty. In setting economic
policy, and particularly in reforming entire European business sectors along
more competitive lines, the EC draws on the power of Article 90(3) of the
56. See Martine Bulard, Les dix points chauds du projet de loi, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 1999, at 8, available at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1999/09/
BULARD/12425.html.
57. Id. See also Jean-Loup Motchane, Alibis ou Solution de Rechange au Liberalisme:
Ces territoires miconnus de l'6conomie sociale et solidaire, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, July
2000, at 4, available at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2000/07/
MOTCHANE/13942.html. Motchane argues that France is in the process of defending a
complex "social economy" that has deep roots in the Middle Ages, and was augmented by
the collectivism of the French revolution and the socialist movements throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Id. He singles out the EC as the carrier of the Liberal
threat against France: "As for European integration, it illustrates one of the aspects of the
confrontation between the social economy and the logic of Liberalism that is being pushed
by the Commission of Brussels." Id. at 5.
58. See Role of the European Commission, at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/




Founding Treaty, which grants it power to implement the Four Freedoms
and the Competition Policy of the Treaty.' ° Called the "Article 90 EC
Directives" ("90 EC Directives"), these EC orders touching on economic
integration are binding on member states and on businesses in Europe.1
The 90 EC Directives are especially powerful because they do not require
62
approval by the European Parliament. In terms of economic policy, then,
the EC, whose highest officers are twenty commissioners with illustrious
political resumes from their respective home countries, is the proverbial
800-pound gorilla that prods member states and the EU itself to actions that
benefit the Union and its people as a whole. Concomitantly, the EC
dissuades "sectoral" interests (i.e., national or regional interests) from
asserting themselves over the interests of the Union as a whole.63
B. Development of the European Commission's
Telecommunications Policy
One of the EC's primary economic policy goals has been the creation
of what it calls Trans-European Networks ("TENs").64 The TEN policy was
conceived as a means of creating larger and more fluid markets for the
European version of the "information society. '65 Telecommunication and
information technology ("IT") in general have been seen as the most fertile
ground for the development of TENs in Europe. Long mired in high
unemployment and extremely low job growth, the EU and its largest
member states-France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom-
view TENs as the key to bringing the European economy onto a
competitive footing with North America and Japan in capturing a global
66
market share in new technologies.
Europe's 3G policy is part of a larger focus on the technological
sector as a solution to Europe's economic problems. In 1997, for instance,
the EC introduced a broad policy called "The European Initiative in
Electronic Commerce." 67 The policy's goal is to "encourage the vigorous
growth of electronic commerce in Europe., 61 The EC's focus is on the




63. See Role of the European Commission, supra note 58.
64. See Sauter, supra note 4, at 83.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. DENIS KELLEHER & KAREN MURRAY, IT LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 83 (1999).
68. Id. (citing EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 97) 157 (1997)).
69. Id. at 83.
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believes that there will be a convergence of various strands of electronic
commerce.70 The EC's acknowledged goal is to use some of its advantages
in cellular phone technology to move itself into a more competitive
position with the United States in electronic commerce generally: "As the
Commission itself admits, electronic commerce is dominated by the United
States. The main priority for Europe must be to build businesses which can
compete with the Americans on the Internet and in electronic commerce.'
Policymakers believe that competitiveness in high speed Internet
technologies and 3G mobile telecommunications will offset Europe's
relatively poor showing in the personal computer and Internet markets of
the 1980s and 1990s.7 The EC's activities throughout the field of
telecommunications and IT are impressive in both scope and direction.
Since the mid-1980s, the EC has vigorously acted to liberalize the
. .. 73
telecommunications market in Europe through myriad policy initiatives,
Directives,74 and sometimes, legal actions against member states and state-
.71
subsidized telecommunication monopolies. The EC has also made large
investments in research and development, and it has established regimes for
cooperation such as joint ventures and mergers, while still aiming at
maintaining competitiveness between firms. 6 In the midst of these efforts,
3G wireless technologies have given the EC great hope.
The EC sees 3G wireless technologies as the key to reviving
European economic performance. 77 The "wonder technologies" that seem
possible with 3G have certainly excited both the EC and investors.7 ' The
70. See id. at 83-84.
71. Id. at 93.
72. See Sauter, supra note 4, at 83 (discussing The Challenges and Way Forward into
the 21st Century: White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, COM(93)700
final).
73. Green Papers and White Papers are the primary methods by which the EU initiates
policy discussions. Green Papers are rather like a policy proposal, along with detailed
discussion and numerous questions posed to the public and governmental bodies. A series of
discussions and meetings take place, and the redrafted version of the Green Paper becomes a
White Paper. See SCADPlus: Glossary, at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000g.
htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2001).
74. Directives resemble something between an American Executive Order and an Act
of Congress. Directives are legally binding and are issued by the European Commission.
75. See Sauter, supra note 4, at 82-86; see also GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 57-62 (2d ed. 1993).
76. Thomas C. Lawton, The Course of EC Technology Policy: European Attempts to
Enhance Industrial Competitiveness Through Research and Development Collaboration, in
EUROPEAN TRADE AND INDUSTRY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN EC LAW
AND POLICY 23 (Kees Jan Kuilwijk & Robert Wright eds., 1996).
77. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
78. Third Generation spectrum licenses in Britain and Germany sold for billions of
dollars, but Belgian prices declined sharply as the year 2000 wore on. See Graeme Wearden,
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prospect of being able to combine the Internet and Global Positioning
technology with voice service means that the entire way of doing business,
not to mention traveling and interacting with people and machines
throughout the world, could be changed.79 The EC hopes that with a rapid
construction of 3G networks in Europe, a multiplier effect will take place in
the European economy. Firms will rush to fill the infrastructure with
products, both hardware and software. If Europe manages to take the lead
in this new technology, demand throughout the rest of the world will fuel
European exports. The idea is that 3G may well become the next
revolutionary product, like the automobile and the personal computer were
when they were first introduced. The analogy to the automobile may be
more apt than initially realized: with 3G, the EC is making member states
build the highways and side streets before the new car has been fully tested.
In its decision to rush 3G into service, the EC had to choose how
spectrum would be allocated. Originally, the EC wanted to use American-
style auctions, where firms would simply bid against each other for
licenses. This desire reflected a faith in the market's ability to sort out the
actual worth of the spectrum and for firms to compete for financing. In the
end, due to the desires of member states, the EC settled on a compromise: it
would allow states to use an American-style auction or a beauty pageant
method favored by the French, Italians, and Spanish.0 As explained below,
this compromise has proven a mistake.
C. Challenges to the European Commission
The EU and the EC are currently losing popular support throughout
the continent at the very time when their vigorous leadership in competition
policy is required. In a speech to the European Parliament in early 2000,
EU President Romano Prodi expressed hope for the future based on the
single currency and the half century of peace in Europe. At the same time,
he was frank about the political dangers the EU faces:
On the other hand, Europe's citizens are disenchanted and anxious.
They have lost faith in the European institutions. They are losing
patience with our slow rate of progress in tackling unemployment. The
prospect of enlargement [of the Union] divides public opinion between
hope and fear-hope for stability and progress, fear of a Europe
EU Telecoms Ministers Meet to Save 3G, ZDNET UK NEws, Apr. 4, 2001, available at
http:llnews.zdnet.co.uklstory/O,,s2085489,00.html. Wearden notes that in the summer of
2000, auctions in Germany and Britain raised £28 billion and £22.5 billion, respectively.
The Belgian auction, held in November, 2000, raised less than £300 million. Id.
79. See generally Buckley, supra note 1.
80. See Reviewing the European Commission White Paper on 3G Services,
EUROPEMEDIA.NET, June 4, 2001, at http://wwwl.europemedia.net/showfeature.asp?Article
ID=2455 (Jose Otero ed.).
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without identity or frontiers.8'
Prodi added that "ordinary Europeans have to be convinced that
Europe's policymakers and decision-makers are capable of decisive and
effective action[,] Tthat [sic] they can modernize Europe and steer it
toward a bright future.""
In a list of policy priorities for the EU, Prodi named job creation and
- ~~83 ••• ,
economic growth first. His general approach to this challenge is "the
right policy mix to ensure stability for the euro and to sustain growth. The
basis for this growth has to be a dynamic Single Market, greater
competitiveness and real efforts to boost research and innovation... ." If
Prodi is correct, then the success of the 3G wireless market has arguably
become central to the political future of the EC.
Despite the implementation of the Euro and the successes the EC has
had in promoting liberalization, Prodi makes clear that the time has come
for fundamental change. So, too, must the very structure of relations
between the EU and member states be changed, Prodi concludes. Greater
integration, Prodi claims, will be made possible only by "radical
decentralization."" Prodi claims that decentralization is both required and
possible. It is required, he says, because the EU is losing political support
among average Europeans. It is possible to decentralize without
endangering European integration, he claims, because the EU's
competition policy (i.e., the favoring of free markets) is now widespread in
the political culture of the member states. So, the old methods of moving
Europe toward integration and competitiveness through direction from
Brussels must be changed, Prodi has concluded.
Indeed, in the wake of Prodi's speech, the EC and a host of
committees within it issued a number of policy papers outlining the goals
of decentralization. For instance, in June 2001, Working Group 3b of the
EC issued its White Paper entitled "Decentralization: Better Involvement of
National, Regional and Local Actors. 8 6 In that White Paper, the Working
Group frankly admitted that there was "democratic deficit" in the EU and
81. EC President Romano Prodi, Shaping the New Europe, Address before the






86. Decentralisation: Better Involvement of National, Regional and Local Actors:




specifically in the EC.87 Furthermore, the Working Group added that "a
centralised top-down approach, which has basically prevailed over the
years," must change. In its review of telecommunications policy, the
Working Group concluded:
Over the last 10 years, the telecommunication sector was increasingly
covered by EU regulation. This was done via two spearheads:
liberalisation and harmonisation repectively based on competition law
and the internal market mechanisms. This policy centralisation led to
what is generally regarded as a success story of competition in
liberalised telecommunications markets being a driving force in the
Information Society.8
9
The Working Group essentially admitted that the policy of
introducing free market techniques into the telecommunications sector on a
Europe wide basis was centrally dictated by the EC. In an attempt to
appease the citizenry of Europe, some of which, like the French, are
unhappy with the EC's forcing of free markets onto their countries, the EC
is now trying to backtrack and decentralize its power. Yet in light of the
persistence of the dirigiste tradition in France, this Note posits that Prodi
and the EC are wrong to decentralize. The EUs future is dependent on
economic integration, according to numerous statements by the EU itself.90
The recent establishment of the Euro and the importance of Brussels as the
champion of European growth mean that the EU's prestige and very
survival may well be tied to economic performance-at a time when the
EU feels constrained to retrench its own ability to carry out policy. The
Working Group itself wondered whether, in fact, the error in
telecommunications policy had been not to go forward with even more
centralization: "At first sight, the experience with the decentralised
implementation approach has been positive. One also has to ask the
question of the cost of non-centralisation, however, i.e. would the success
for this EU policy have been even greater if definition and implementation
had been more centralized?" 91
The answer this Note posits is a resounding "yes."
IV. SPECTRUM ALLOCATION IN FRANCE
A. General Structure
France has created scarcity in the 3G market, much as other nations
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id. at 28.
89. Id. at 18.
90. See, e.g., SCADPIus, supra note 54.
91. EC White Paper, supra note 86, at 18.
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have done, by limiting the number of nationwide spectrum licenses it will
issue. In light of the prices that winning bidders paid in auctions in the
United States, Great Britain, and Germany, the French saw it fit to raise
their fees to reflect market realities more accurately.92 Now, France will
demand that each licensee pay approximately 5 billion Euros, or $4.8
billion.93 After all, it makes little sense for the French to undervalue their
spectrum.94 One might conclude that the result is that spectrum will cost
the same across Europe. Indeed, the crux of this Note's argument is that
cost is secondary; thus, what matters most is the resulting regime under
which these costs are contracted. But as the French example shows, the
fixing of prices can have disastrous results.95
France's beauty pageant method of spectrum allocation works much
as its eponym would indicate. Contestants are invited to submit detailed
applications to the Autoritj de rdgulation des tilicommunications ("ART"),
which is the French equivalent of the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"). The contestants are then graded on a point scale,
reflecting how well each contestant satisfies ART's criteria. The four
highest scores are awarded the licenses.
96ART requires each contestant to commit to a series of obligations.
Obligations are to be "clear" and "explicit.' '97 To eliminate confusion, they
are to be accompanied by the precise formula of: "We undertake to. .. ,,98
ART reserves the right to impose other obligations if forecasts are laid out
in sufficient detail. In particular, contestants must agree to specific service
launch dates, the extent of coverage at those dates, the type of services
92. ART Chairman Jean-Michel Hubert, Mobility Futures: Competing Visions of a 3G
World, Speech Before the Analysys Conference (Nov. 29, 2000), at http://www.art-
telecom.fr/communiques/discours/analysys-eng.htm. [hereinafter Hubert London Speech].
93. Id. Hubert adds that "[h]alf of this amount has to be paid over two years, with the
remainder payable over 13 years." Id.
94. See id Hubert states that the decision to raise the license price in France:
[Blelonged to the government, which wanted to take two factors into account:
first, the impact of the UK auction on the economic equilibrium of the European
market; and second the government's analysis of how much operators are able to
contribute, given that further outlays will be needed to build up a network.
Id.
95. Peter Sayer, 3G-France Awards Just Two UMTS Licenses, IDG.NET, at http://
www.idg.net/english/crdLfrance_550610.html (May 31, 2001). The French succeeded in
attracting only two applicants for 3G licenses because the government, relying on earlier
auctions, fixed the price too high, long after markets re-evaluated the worth of spectrum. Id.
96. Appel it candidatures pour l'introduction des systlmes mobiles de 3 me
gdndration: informations compldmentaires relatives a I'appel a candidatures, from Autoritj
de rdgulation des tilicommunications, at http:llwww.art-telecom.fr/dossiers/umts/umts-





available, the extent and the speed of a contestant's 3G network, and the
quality of service.99
B. Selection Criteria
As mentioned above, the essence of the beauty pageant method is that
the firms who submit applications must lay out a detailed business plan.
ART then grades the firms according to its own open set of criteria. In a set
of three publications, it has laid out the general criteria, as well as some
additional information on how those criteria will be evaluated. ART lays
out its grading scale as indicated in Table 1. In sum, there are fourteen




(a) Launch date 15
(b) Services available 50
(c) Relationship with service providers 30
(d) Relationship with subscribers and users of services 15
(e) Tariff rate 15
(f) Size of network 15
(g) Extent of network and speed of network deployment (extent
defined in terms of percentage of the population and detailed in
step with the type of service and sales) 100
(h) Quality of service 15
(i) Ability of the project to maximize resources and frequency 15
(j) Capacity to provide users with international roaming service 15
(k) Environmental preservation initiatives 15
(1) Employment: quantitative aspects (forecasted job creation) and
qualitative aspects (facilities, qualifications, training) 25
(m) Coherence and credibility of the business plan 75
(n) Coherence and credibility of the project 100
TOTAL 500
99. Id.
100. Autoritd de r6gulation des te6communications, Annexe a la decision 00-835. Avis
Relatif aux modalitds et conditions d'attribution des autorisations pour l'introduction en
France m~tropolitaine des syst~mes mobiles de 3" g~n~ration. Document 2: conditions
g6n~ralaes de la procedure d'autorisation des exploitants de syst mes mobiles terrestres de
3 ' g6nration (DMT2000), § 11-2-3, available at http:llwww.art-telecom.fr/textes/avislO0/
appel3g.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2001) [hereinafter ART Doc. 2].
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The level of detail that ART demands for each criterion above, as
well as the unequivocal nature of the obligations once made, indicates that
government bureaucrats will exercise a great deal of influence in shaping
the 3G market in France.
Factors (a) through (e) in Table 1 alone account for 125 of the 500
possible points. These are what we might characterize as "market shaping"
factors. Factor (a), the launch date, is weighted only at fifteen points. The
offer of services, factor (b), however, is weighted at fifty. As ART explains
in regard to this factor, the French Telecommunications Agency will
"evaluate the project's contribution to the mobile multimedia market, and,
more generally, its contribution to the development of the Information
Society in France."'' 1  There can be little doubt that policy goals have
driven the articulation of this important factor.' °2 ART adds that its
consideration of the service availability values diversification from Second
Generation ("2G") services.'0 3 ART tells contestants it will examine this
factor for "the clarity and the relevance of the proposed offers, in light of
the targeted clienteles."' 14 One might translate ART's bureaucratic
language by referring to Hubert's plain English. In regard to factor (b), the
offer of services, Hubert stated that he stresses "the obligation to provide a
pre-determined set of services, including voice, Internet access, data
transmission and user location, together with obligations of availability and
service quality."'0 5 Hubert added that this factor was weighted so heavily
for "[o]ne simple reason: we want real 3G services ....,,06 This Note
argues that the incentive that ART has created for contestants is to commit
to advanced (and speculative) 3G service schemes as quickly as possible,
before the market, or clientele, for such services has even developed.
Closely related to the "market shaping" factors are factors (c), (d) and
(e), which together account for sixty of the 500 possible points. We might
label these factors collectively as "market-structural" factors. ART explains
that it will look at the structure of proposed agreements between licensees
and service providers based on how well they further goals of openness and
fairness in business, as well as how likely they are to lead to a
diversification of services.'07 Factor (d), the relationship between
101. ART Doc. 2, supra note 100, at § IHI-2-4 (b) (author's translation).
102. See Hubert London Speech, supra note 92 (stating that the beauty pageant was
devised "because it can be used to select candidates according to objective criteria that
reflect the principles of public policy").
103. ART Doc. 2, supra note 100, at § 11I-2-4 (b).
104. Id. (author's translation).
105. Hubert London Speech, supra note 92.
106. Id.
107. ART Doc. 2, supra note 100, at § 11I-2-4 (c).
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subscribers and users of services, is evaluated down to the detailed level of
proposed contracts for 3G services. Such contracts are evaluated for
conformity with the legal rights of consumers, as well as the clarity of the
tariff plans.'08 Factor (e), the tariff rate, is evaluated according to the rate
structure's ability to stimulate further technological development of
services. The rate structures are evaluated according to various scenarios
associated with reasonable rate plans.
ART requests detailed information on the organizational structure and
financial status of each contestant. For instance, a contestant should submit
an organizational chart detailing the "direct or indirect" role of each
significant corporate partner, parent, or subsidiary with which it is involved
in any way."0 An extrait Kbis disclosure form is required from the
contestant and from its principal shareholders."' Industrial and commercial
agreements between the contestant and "all suppliers or subcontractors"
must be described. Further, contestants must detail all licenses they hold in
foreign countries. The translation of each license into French "could be
recommended as long as the contestant thinks it helpful for its file."
'
"1 2
The capital reserves of the contestant are also of great concern to
ART. Thus, from the date a corporation submits its application to the date
of the signing of the license, the corporation must keep ART updated as to
its capitalization. A change in capitalization is no excuse to modify the
application after it has been submitted."' ART is clear that no part of the
application can be changed after submission; a change in the application
means automatic elimination." 4 Therefore, ART will determine if a change
in capitalization is significant enough to be considered to have changed the
application itself. If so considered, the contestant is eliminated."
5
ART's concern with the contestant's capitalization is grounded in
more than a general concern for the financial solvency of licensees. The
French regulatory body's selection criteria indicate that it will examine the
application much as a bank examines a business plan before agreeing to
make a loan and take a security interest in the collateral. Indeed, the
selection criteria indicate that ART has faith in its ability to evaluate
108. Id. § m11-2-4 (d).
109. Id. § 1m-2-4 (e).
110. ART Overview, supra note 96 (stating: "Comme precis6 au paragraphe 11-1 du
document 2 de l'appel fournir dans leur dossier un organigramme en cascade des socidt~s
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detailed business plans from both financial and technical perspectives. This
Note argues that the inescapable conclusion is that ART believes it has the
ability to predict, or dictate to a significant degree, what the 3G market will
look like in the future.
As indicated in Table 1, ART intends to review the business plan for
general coherence, as well as for financial soundness. More importantly,
ART's evaluation of the corporate business plan will account for seventy-
five of the total 500 points, as indicated in Table 1. Such weight in the
overall scale indicates the level of confidence ART places in its own
business judgment. Accordingly, ART goes so far as to examine not only
the coherence of the business plan, but also its future profitability. 16 Its
review of profitability is indexed according to levels of service offered. "
7
The level of detail that ART demands is telling. Each business plan
submitted must indicate every financial commitment that the contestant
makes, including letters of intent or signed financial commitments from the
relevant individual or organization." 8 The business plan and supporting
documents must be composed according to French accounting methods or,
if translated from another language, they must be easily read and
understood in French. Accounting hypotheses and methods of amortization
must be defined." 9 All forecasted, network-wide expenses and revenues
must be accounted for and supplied in paper form and electronic form (in
Microsoft Excel format) to ART. ART reserves the right to require a
contestant to answer a confidential follow-up questionnaire.
2
'
ART also demands a detailed technical description of each
contestant's proposed national 3G network. ART will evaluate the planned
network for its ability to meet factors (f) through (j) in Table 1. When it
comes to technical detail, ART's policy can be summed up simply as "the
more the better. 12 ' A list of firms supplying equipment in the construction
of the network is requested, as well as "a summary of the principal
contractual terms binding [the contestant] to each supplier.' ' 2 ART adds
that "documentation, furnished by the builders, on the equipment
composing the network may also be attached to the [contestant's file]. 1 24
116. ART Doc. 2, supra note 100, at § 11I-2-4 (d).
117. Id.
118. ART Overview, supra note 96.
119. Id.
120. ART Doc. 2, supra note 100, at § 11-6.
121. ART Overview, supra note 96.
122. Id. ("Therefore, it is desirable that candidates submit the most clear and precise data
possible concerning the construction of their networks.") (author's translation).
123. Id. (author's translation).
124. Id. (author's translation).
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As Table 1 indicates, 160 of the 500 possible points are awarded on the
basis of ART's evaluation of the technical aspects of the plan. ART makes
clear that candidates should guarantee that coverage is effective twenty-
four hours a day.'2 ART further specifies that coverage should reach
ninety-five percent of the outdoor area of planned network coverage both
for voice and for 144 KB data transmission. All of the mathematical
calculations used to determine coverage must be explained. 27 ART's
detailed explanation of its requirements for review of a contestant's
network architecture includes nine subcriteria. 2 8 The specifics a contestant
must provide on long distance service give an indication of how detailed
the plan must be:
c) infrastructure for long distance transmission: nature (owned, leased,
technology used (telegraphic, by hertzian bundle)), characteristics and
geographic coverage zone; types of equipment used; standards used;
schedule of construction and of launch; the candidate will distinguish
actual installations already in existence (in the case of candidates
already possessing a GSM license) from those to be constructed, for
which [the candidate] will provide a forecasted schedule of
deployment.1
29
In the case of a tie among contestants, ART will use the grading scale





Extent of network and speed of network deployment (extent
defined in terms of percentage of the population and detailed in
step with the type of service and sales) 100
Coherence and credibility of the business plan 75
Coherence and credibility of the project 100
TOTAL 325
As is evident from this list of four factors (which corresponds exactly




128. See ART Doc. 2, supra note 100, at § 11-4.
129. Id. § 11-4 (c) (author's translation). -.
130. Id. § 111-2-9.
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on the more general factors. One could argue that these factors are also the
most subjective. In any case, the tie-breaking method highlights which
criteria ART views as most important.
C. Fear of the Market
In a speech in London in November 2000, Jean-Michel Hubert, the
Director of ART, defended the beauty pageant method because it is
"pertinent, effective and transparent - qualities that belie the criticism
leveled at it in Europe over the past two years."' 3 ' Hubert defined
pertinence as its effectiveness in serving public policy goals. 132 He defined
effectiveness on the basis that "licences are granted in a manner that is
economically viable for operators.' 33 Hubert argued that the beauty
pageant "is transparent because, in the case of the wireless local loop, we
published all the documents involved in the selection process, including the
memorandums relative to each criteria for each operator .... No disputes
have arisen from this [wireless local loop] beauty contest.' ' 34 Hubert's
defense of the beauty pageant goes beyond these general points.
Hubert argued that the beauty pageant reflects the desires of all
involved, from ART to market participants. 35 He also posited that beauty
pageants are more susceptible to the control of participants."' This was a
apparent critique of the behind-the-scenes financial "wheeling and dealing"
that is perceived to accompany auctions. Hubert said as much when he
claimed that beauty pageants are "more favourable to market development
than auctions, which force candidates to be selected on the basis of
financial criteria only, with other important considerations being
disregarded."'' 37 Hubert's faith in the French government's ability to shape
and manage the market was evident in public comments at the end of
2000-so were his misgivings about free market allocation.
Hubert identified two main criticisms of ART's beauty pageant. The
first dealt with the "limited legitimacy of the regulator's choices, stemming
from the view that the market is better placed than technocrats to ascertain
what the consumer needs."'' 38 Hubert responded to this criticism by
referring to the "political commitment" that was driving universal 3G










territorial coverage--"a major concern for Europe."'3 9 The second area of
criticism that Hubert identified was the claim that the beauty pageant
lacked transparency. 140 This criticism is also derived from market-oriented
preferences, so it is actually a derivative of the first area of criticism. In any
event, Hubert explained that the auction process itself had been the subject
of much dispute.' 4' He added that the "increasingly high drop-out rate" of
successful auction bidders "would suggest that beauty contests offer at least
the same guarantee of transparency as auctions.' 42
Hubert, in the true French dirigiste tradition, openly expressed his
reservation about the disorganized and apparently inefficient free market:
According to economic theory, auctions are an economically efficient
procedure because they reflect the price of the licences as assessed by
the players themselves, and not by an outsider to the market. However,
this view overlooks the fact that, in practice, some players, namely the
2G operators, have to obtain a 3G licence to remain present in the
market and that the actual possibility of withdrawing - a pre-
condition for auctions - does not exist in this market.
43
Hubert went on to highlight the nasty realities of the European
financial system. The upshot of his comments indicate a suspiciousness of
the unscientific, overly-emotional nature of the venture capital market:
The system of European financing will be put to the test, with the
result that some operators, including European majors, have decided
not to compete in several countries. This partly explains why the
financial markets have been correcting their overly optimistic and
sometimes irrational expectations in the past few months. This also
shows that appreciations of the market is [sic] made at a specific time,
not on [sic] the long term. It is excessive and can be dangerous"
44
The market had led to overexuberance in the recent past, and now was
leading to excessive pessimism, Hubert stated. The French Government,
however, has clearly seen the middle course:
France did not share the euphoria that gripped economic circles, and
even the governments, in the spring, when the prices that states could
charge operators appeared to have become more important than the
success of a new market.
And France does not intend to yield to the concern - or the pessimism
139. Id. This response only begs the question, however. The EC, like ART, is just as
susceptible to criticism that it is a distant bureaucracy that is shaping trans-European policy





143. Hubert London Speech, supra note 92.
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-that is being expressed now, less than six months later, at least in
some countries and by some operators.
145
These comments reveal the French regulator's uneasiness with change
in market valuation. Hubert believes that market valuation of a commodity
should be based on an objective, timeless estimation of intrinsic value, not
on changing supply and demand variables as informed by changing market
information. Hubert did, however, make a concession to the wisdom of the
market:
But we should also bear in mind that the market will maintain a degree
of freedom regarding the pace of its own development. That is its
freedom and its strength, because it's the market that will answer these
questions, which are still asked: what services for which consumers
and at what price?
146
The latter point Hubert makes is, of course, difficult to square with
the emphasis ART places on having contestants guarantee specific 3G
market services.147
Public policy will influence not only the extent and type of 3G
services that contestants offer, but also basic business decisions about the
size, training, and type of workforce required to do the job. Factor (1) in
Table 1 is ART's employment criterion, worth twenty-five points of the
total. ART indicates that it will review a contestant's general plan for the
potential to create jobs, and for how well licensees undertake to provide for
job training. In a country with serious structural unemployment
problems, the job creation factor cannot be dismissed lightly. 49 Although
only accounting for twenty-five points out of 500, it may have more
influence than its numerical weight appears to give it. Some "seepage" of
this factor into other factors is not impossible to imagine if one remembers
that some of the biggest categories are highly subjective.
ART appears ready to enforce the obligations that a successful
contestant makes. Licensees will be "obligated to participate in the
financing of two yearly investigations (enquetes) undertaken for review by
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (stating that contestants have "the obligation to provide a pre-determined set of
services, including voice, Internet access, data transmission and user location, together with
obligations of availability and service quality.").
148. ART Doc. 2, supra note 100, § II-2-4 (c).
149. The French unemployment rate had been at 12.6% until 1997. See French
Unemployment Rises, BBC NEWS, July 31, 2001, at
http://news.bbc.co.uklhi/english/business/newsid_1466000/1466515.stm. The 9% rate that
France enjoyed in January 2001 was twice that of the United States and slightly above the




the Authority, one concerning the quality of service, the other concerning
the coverage of the population by 3G services.' 50 ART clearly intends to
closely monitor at least these obligations. ART's control will also extend to
the quality of voice services that 2G users will receive if the 3G network
takes the place of the 2G network. 15 So, what were the results of ART's
system of spectrum allocation?
D. Results
On May 31, 2001, ART announced the results of its beauty pageant.
There were only two winners: France Teq6com's subsidiary, Orange SA,
and Vivendi Universal's subsidiary, SFR. ' , 2 The reason why there were
only two licensees, rather than the four that ART had originally planned to
issue, was that only two firms bothered to apply. 153 Two other leading firms
that were considered likely to obtain a license if they only applied-Suez
Lyonnaise and Bouygues Telecom-withdrew their applications at the last
minute, citing the 32.5 billion francs ($4.8 billion) fixed price tag set by the
French government as too high.' 4
Given the recent threat of economic recession and the troubles that
have beset the telecom sector, ART may have made an error in setting a
fixed price many months ago. In extrapolating from even earlier free
market auctions in Germany and Britain, while trying to make complicated
adjustments for all sorts of factors, ART may have outsmarted itself instead
of the market. Further, while the two firms that pulled out of the French
beauty pageant did not mention other possible factors in their decisions to
withdraw, one might wonder whether the detailed control that ART
regulators would exercise throughout the life of the license was not the sort
of arrangement those smaller firms craved, especially considering that such
government supervision would cost as much as it did.
Hubert appears chastened but undaunted. While Hubert's bravado that
France would not be swayed by momentary over- and under-valuations in
the market has apparently mellowed, his general belief that the government
can outsmart markets persists. In a session before the French National
150. Autorit6 de rdgulation des telcommunications. Annexe a la decision 00-835. Avis
Relatif aux modalit6s et les conditions d'attribution des autorisations pour l'introduction en
France mdtropolitaine des syst~mes mobiles de 3' gdndration. Document 1 : principales
dispositions des autorisations pour des syst~mes mobiles de 3 "' gdn6ration, § 3, at
http:/www.art-telecom.fr/textes/avis00/appel3g-l.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2001)
[hereinafter ART Doc. 1].
151. Id §4.
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Assembly's Finance Committee, Hubert had to explain why only two
applicants remained in the running for the French licenses. 55 His
explanation politely stated that ART had focused on technical issues,
whereas the national government had set the price, and that both factors
played a role.
151
Hubert's appearance before the Finance Committee, however, was
evidently not for the purpose of apportioning blame; most of his comments
were directed toward a possible solution. 157 Hubert added that a second
beauty pageant was required in order to bring France in line with EU policy
regarding the required number of 3G licenses."S He also voiced concern
about a potential "duopoly" between the new licensees, especially if the
remaining licenses are not assigned relatively quickly. 59 The new beauty
pageant, he stated, would have to ensure that the two firms already chosen
were not left behind. 16 Further, Hubert said, in allusion to the price issue,
that a central concern was to manage effectively the timing of the beauty
pageant. Ironically, especially for a government bureaucrat who is
attempting to fix prices and outsmart the market, Hubert's analogy for good
timing was the example of successful initial public offerings ("IPOs") on
the stock market. He admitted that the original goal of 3G services
would not realistically occur until 2004, due to equipment shortages.
166
Drawing exactly the opposite conclusion from ART's spectacular
failure with its vaunted beauty pageant, French legislator Jacques Guyard
noted that Hubert's comments showed how difficult it is for
"professionals" (apparently meaning telecom industry specialists) "to
manage the future."'6 Another legislator faulted the lack of leadership in
the EU on telecom policy.' Pierre Forgues, another legislator, openly
questioned the contradiction between the fluid nature of the predictions of
future value of the 3G market and the method by which the price of 32.5
155. See Sur l'attribution des licenses de t'elphonie mobile (UMTS): Assemblde
Nationale Commision des Finances, de l'Economie Gdndnale et du Plan, Compte Rendu No.
48 (2001) (statement of Jean-Michel Hubert), available at http:llwww.assemblee-nat.fr/cr-













billion francs ($4.8 billion) was reached and fixed. 166 Hubert replied that the
national government set the price and that that price seemed "equitable and
reasonable" at the time it was set. Hubert also said that in autumn of 2001,
ART would set a date for another beauty pageant.
67
In light of the serious failure of the first beauty pageant, it is hardly
pessimistic to wonder how the second one will rescue the prestige of the
French in the telecom policy field. At a time when Europe's commitment to
3G is profound yet confused, the failure of the French even to allocate their
four licenses must make one now wonder whether the newly anticipated
date of 2004 for 3G services across the EU is realistic.
V. GENERAL CONSEQUENCES
Financially, the firms that win the 3G licenses may end up very
strapped for cash. The licensing must be financed and the networks must be
built. Licensing alone is expected to raise 200 billion Euros for the member
states.' 6 The firm of Arthur D. Little estimates that in the short term, to
deal with licensing and building networks, European financial institutions
will be solicited for financing in the amount of 1.5 trillion francs.1
69
In Britain or Germany, a firm that has won a license may proceed to
build the sort of network it wants, if it survives the financial obstacles in
the short term. The firm's own choices of what infrastructure to build and
what services to offer, informed by changing information, will determine
costs. Thus, in Britain or Germany, a firm can theoretically choose to cover
the entire country but offset the expense by offering fewer services,
combining with its rivals to share costs, or staying away from the higher
capacity performance levels.' 70 In France, however, before even offering
3G to customers, the two (or will it be ultimately be four?) firms will have
already committed to a whole range of choices and costs.1 The coverage,
service, and quality commitments will be made years in advance of going
to market because ART requires detailed plans in order to issue a license.
72
While the British licensees will likely have more flexibility than their
French counterparts, they may effectively face the same challenges to reach
profitability because of the huge premiums they paid for their licenses at
166. Id.
167. Hubert Statement, supra note 155.
168. Id.
169. See Garcia & Duarte Interview, supra note 3.
170. See Wearden, supra note 78 (firms have several levels to choose from, such as: 144
kb/s, 220 kb/s, or 384 kb/s).
171. See generally ART Overview, supra note 96.
172. Id.
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auction. Yet flexibility may do the trick in Britain. After all, compared to
France there are relatively few government constraints on how a firm
chooses to use its spectrum. Unforeseen new technologies and firms may
offer creative uses yet unvisualized. Looking at France, numerous
questions arise when contemplating the future in light of ART's many
constraints.
Ignacio Garcia Alves and Bruno Duarte, analysts for the firm of
Arthur D. Little, criticize the EC for having been captured by the desiresr-171
and propaganda of the mobile phone equipment manufacturers. They
pose a slew of questions that to date are unanswered. Most trenchant is
their insight that the so-called 2.5G, based on the GPRS platform, will
deliver many aspects of the Internet to customers in the short term on
existing 2G wireless infrastructure. 74 The two analysts see 2.5G as a
crucial phase that should not be bypassed for the sake of building 3G
quickly. GPRS, they point out, will allow consumers to make preferences
for which sort of services providers will offer in advance of 3G. GPRS will
also allow firms to gauge the true demand for such services Union-wide.
Finally, GPRS is much cheaper than 3G, and the latter has not yet seen any
agreement on how billing will be figured: Would one bill by the kilobyte,
which could lead to quasi-free voice services? Yet, Europe is on the fast
lane to build 3G in an effort to compete with the Americans and the
Japanese. The issues that arise out of the 3G billing question pale in
comparison to the potential dangers facing 3G licensees should they
overestimate future demand in vying for licenses today.
Growth in demand for mobile telephones may not mirror the
optimistic predictions of industry experts. For instance, shares in telecom
giants such as Nokia fell 8.3% in one day in January 2001 on reports of
weaker sales than expected.175 Although Nokia sold 64% more handsets in
2000 than in 1999 (compared to 45% growth worldwide for the entire
industry), it fell seven million sales short of industry expectations, selling
only 128 million.176 Mobile phone penetration in Europe already stands at
60%, and the penetration rate in Finland is 80%. 1 Whether Europe will
match Finland's rate is in some doubt: "To drive sales, Nokia is banking on
a European culture in which owning a mobile phone is as much a necessity
as a fashion statement .... [But] there are real questions as to whether the
173. See Garcia & Duarte Interview, supra note 3.
174. Id.
175. Suzanne Kapner, A Nokia Report Rattles Telecommunications Shares, N.Y. TIMES,





industry can maintain growth given an unexpected slowdown in
Europe... ,,178 Nokia's commitment to cellular phones should give some
3G aficionados reason to pause: Nokia was selected by one of France's two
3G licensees to build 3G infrastructure in the areas of mobility core, radio
access technology, terminals (i.e., what users will carry to interface with
3G), and services. 17' Thus, in the foreseeable future 3G in France will
likely be wedded to the cellular phone, which may make transition to
handhelds and other devices difficult.
As the Arthur D. Little analysts point out, the optimistic forecasts for
3G were based on reasoning by extrapolation because the applications of
the 3G environment likely do not even exist at present:
Today, no 'killer application' seems to stand out. Many operators,
manufacturers, and observers reason by extrapolating from set
applications that they know: mobile internet, mobile office, or e-
commerce. However, it is likely in the end that the development of
high capacity applications specific to mobility and to ubiquity, such as
applications linked to the location of the client, will contribute
significantly to the development of the market.1
80
The same considerations prompted Palm Canada's president, Michael
Moskowitz, to declare that "3G is a little over-hyped .... The reality is that
the Internet is not friendly to mobile devices. But over time, the Internet
will bend."'' Slow 3G consumer demand also concerns the fairly
optimistic Dan Gardiner of the UK-based Ovum, who sees fast global 3G
growth taking off around 2007.182 With a careful strategy focusing on "a
gradual expansion of service from high-revenue, densely populated centers
to less profitable outlying regions," firms can expect to see returns on
investment only in 2006.83
Beauty pageant licensees and auction winners will face similar
financial challenges, but each may be constrained in meeting these
challenges differently. For the winners in France, the goal may be to
renegotiate the coverage, performance, and service promises that sounded
good in 2001 to more realistic goals. It will certainly be in the interests of
ART and the French Government to favor such requests by France
Telecom. One can rightly ask, however, whether the other new licensees
178. Id.
179. See Nokia to Build 3G Networks for France Telecom, WIRELESS NEwSFACTOR, at
http://www.wirelessnewsfactor.com/perl/story/5318.html (Oct. 27, 2000).
180. See Garcia & Duarte Interview, supra note 3.
181. See Daniel Sieberg, Palm Canada President: 3G Wireless 'Over-hyped,' CNN.coM,
at http:llwww.cnn.com/200llTECHIptech/O3/15/palm.keynote (Mar. 15, 2000).
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will receive similar treatment. Likewise, the risks of special deals between
the French government-owned railway, SNCF, and France Telecom, with
ART approval, to undercut outside licensees, are not totally unrealistic. For
instance, the ART selection criteria include provisions to protect the
environment, which means, as ART explains, that new licensees will have
to share towers with current 2G licensees in France.I' 4 The 2G licensees in
France will set the terms of the negotiations.' Thus, with three out of the
four licensees predestined to go to 2G operators, and with ART playing the
arbitrator's role in overseeing the manner in which 2G giants allow an
upstart 3G licensee to share its sites, one can legitimately wonder about
transparency and fairness in the context of actual network construction. In
sum, the power that ART holds over its licensees will be considerable if 3G
market weakness leads any of them to ask for new terms.
Just how one squares the European policy goal of liberalizing the
telecommunications market with the extraordinary (merely ordinary in the
French context, however) degree of control ART will exercise over its
licensees remains to be seen. European observers are rightly skeptical that
the French beauty pageant system with all of its strings attached actually
meshes with European policy. The European Commission's Working
Group 3b raised this specter in its review of telecommunications policy at
the EC level:
The legislation left a lot of freedom for implementation. This led to a
diversity of national conditions which does not necessarily optimise
the creation of an internal market in this sector .... The result is, that,
as widely recognised by national (de)regulators, the EU playing field
in the sector is not 'level' and is indeed very distorted.1
86
Faced with the debacle of 3G licensing to date, the European
Parliament met in mid-April with the goal of ironing out EU telecom policy
and saving 3G. I" Initially, the parliament agreed to allow the EU to have
the final word on proposals made by national regulators, such as ART, but
political pressure ruled out a centralization of policy. Instead, the EU
allowed itself to have a two-month freeze on any regulations it found
contravened EU policy.' EU politicians hoped that such an interim
solution would encourage coordination among national telecom
ministers.189 In light of reports of discord between national regulators on 3G
184. See ART Overview, supra note 96.
185. See id
186. EC White Paper, supra note 86, at 19.
187. David Neal, 3G Poses Threat to European Union, ZDNET UK NEWS, at





policy, 90 however, it is difficult to see how 3G will be saved as a coherent
EU policy absent a strong assertion of power by the EC itself.
France, it must be remembered, raised the prices of its licensing
significantly, after the example of the British and German auctions. This
price hike means that not only will firms operating in France face the same
financial difficulties that British firms face, but also will face the added,
and some might say onerous, regulatory constraints imposed by ART's
"beauty pageant" allocation system. The financial challenges can be
immense. Nicolas Negroponte, the director of MIT Media Lab, calls the
high licensing fees at auction an "economically unsustainable" tax on new
technology.' 9 ' Indeed, the high costs of the licenses that firms paid and the
upcoming "years of losses because of their 3G investment" have prompted
European telecom officials to meet in order to devise methods of saving
3G.192
One thing is certain: nothing about 3G appears to be going according
to schedule. Belgium, Italy, and Portugal were slow to implement spectrum
allocation procedures long before France utterly failed to assign its four
licenses. Belgium is running at least six to nine months behind the EC's
schedule, which means that the January 2002 starting date of 3G is already
unrealistic. 19 The goal of the uniform starting date was to provide a critical
mass of consumers to equipment manufacturers. 94 With Belgium being the
capital of the EU itself, as well as the crossroads for travelers on the high
speed Eurostar, it is unclear what the effect of such a gap in 3G coverage
for even six months will be. The failure of a major European country like
France to allocate its licenses points to even deeper troubles for 3G and for
European telecommunications policy in general.
VI. CONCLUSION
The EC has erred in two crucial aspects. First, in imposing short-term
deadlines and pushing for the speedy creation of a 3G market, the EC may
have invited telecom firms and financial institutions to overcommit
themselves to a market whose actual services, and ultimate consumer
demand, are still only speculative. This is dirigisme in action. This error is
190. See Jane Wakefield, Ministers and EC Lock Horns Over Telcom Laws, ZDNr UK
NEws, at http:lnews.zdnet.co.ukstoryO,,t269-s2085528,00.html (April 6, 2001).
191. Sarah Parkes, Promise of Auction Windfalls Lures European Governments, GLOBAL
WIRELESS, July 1, 2000, at 18.
192. See Wearden, supra note 78.
193. Jean-Yves Huwart, Licences UMTS: modalities d'attibution connues en juin; Selon
toute vraisemblance, les dossiers de candidatures seront deposes en septembre, L'ECHO,
March 23,2000, at 10, available at http://www.lexis.com.
194. Id.
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not as serious as the second error this Note would identify, however.
Once the EC decided to pursue a dirigiste path, it should not have
flinched. One can, as Alexander Hamilton knew, be dirigiste in a number
of ways, including mandating free markets and the decentralization that
competition brings, via a strong central government along the American
federal model.' 95 The willingness of the U.S. Supreme Court to interpret
our federal constitution's Commerce Clause as requiring a national market,
along with federal preemption, has shown that centralized national
governmental policy can encourage free markets and the larger
decentralization that free markets bring.! The EC, however, sought a
middle ground. Rather than requiring free market auctions for 3G licenses,
it yielded to the demands of countries like France that wanted to maintain
substantial control over the selection of the license and near-managerial
control over the future market. The problem is that this manner of
proceeding undercuts the EC's policy of market liberalization and of
greater competition among European firms.
Now that EC President Romano Prodi is pushing for further
decentralization of the EU, including the weakening of the EC itself, it is
certainly true that the terms of the debate at least favor the member states in
any confrontation with the EC. Thus, any member state that wants to revert
to dirigiste norms may have an easier chance now than at any time in the
recent past.
The irony is that if the 3G market is going to be the motor for
European growth in the next decade, the EC will have put itself in a
position where its major policy initiative, for which it will take credit and
blame, is now firmly in the hands of the member states. One can hope that
Prodi is correct in his assessment of the triumph of competition policy in
Europe and of free market mentalities among the member states. The
detailed examination of the French beauty pageant method of spectrum
allocation, however, indicates that significant risks to free market
competition have been introduced in the 3G market before 3G has even
been built. In light of the French reassertion of hostility to free markets and
France's clinging to its "social economy," one may wonder whether the
failure of 3G policy harmonization in Europe is a harbinger of even greater
failures to come in the implementation of a united Europe.
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